Antitrust laws generally seek to promote cised or not, involves power to control the competition in U.S. markets. Alternatively, market and to set arbitrary and unreasonable these laws attempt to correct the type of prices. market failure that occurs when the market Through a series of court decisions, agreedoes not sustain price competition or embodies ments among competing sellers to fix prices undesirable features, such as prices fixed and were deemed illegal per se under Section 1 of agreed upon by rival sellers. It is well known the Sherman Act. Overt price collusion thus is that the federal policy to curb price-fixing regarded as a criminal conspiracy. The crimiagreements was central to the enactment of nalization of the price-fixing rule in effect the Sherman Act of 1890. Formal cartels of the means that the law punishes attempts to fix 19th and early 20th centuries, with their sales prices. The economic impact of the actual quotas, exclusive sales agencies, price-fixing pricing decisions of rival sellers in price-fixing committees, and customer and geographic conspiracies is of no significance in determinsales allocations, apparently have been eliming guilt, even if the coconspirators maximized inated from the contemporary scene. Despite losses instead of profits. This potential discrepthe disappearance of United States based ancy between intent and completed acts places formal cartels, there has been considerable litipreeminence on the legal conspiracy doctrine gation in recent years over pricing behavior of rather than the economist's price theory. individual firms. A wide array of agricultural According to Posner, this situation is unfortuand food industries have been involved in these nate because many attempts to fix prices may actions.
have negligible economic consequences, whereThe purposes of this article are (1) to describe as serious price fixing may escape the detecthe current status of federal price-fixing litition of overt communication [16, p. 41] . gation in the United States with particular reRealities, of course, must dominate the ference to food firms and industries, (2) to disdetermination of whether or not a certain relacuss economic issues involved in price-fixing tionship is objectionable. The mere fact that litigation, and (3) to relate legal implications of the parties to an agreement eliminate competicompetition and antitrust actions. tion between themselves is not enough to condemn it [1] . In grey areas the Supreme Court has applied the "rule of reason" instead of the
The term "price fixing" is meant to refer primarily to price agreements among rival sellers.
INCIDENCE OF PRICE-FIXING Depending on the nature of a particular case, LITIGATION litigation involving rigged prices, exchange of price information, and/or price discrimination Price-fixing actions are filed under the also may be closely related to "price fixing." authority of several federal statutes, but priThe aim and result of every price-fixing marily the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade agreement, if it is effective, is the elimination Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act. of one form or another of competition. The
Under the Sherman Act, the U.S. Attorney power to fix prices, whether reasonably exerGeneral may bring either civil or criminal suits and coconspirators are engaged in a combinaThe relative increase in private rather than tion and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint government actions in recent years is due to of interstate trade and commerce in violation the proliferation of class action suits having of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This charge the potential reward of treble damages.
usually is followed by somewhat more specific Private treble damage suits require proof of an charges that the defendants and coconspiraantitrust violation by the defendant, proof that tors fixed and/or raised prices, exchanged price the plaintiff has been damaged as a result of information, submitted rigged bids, or conthe violation, and proof of the extent of the spired to maintain and stabilize list prices. In damages.
addition to price-fixing charges, the cases often In terms of the type of food products, one include allegations that defendants allocated half of the price-fixing cases involved dairy territories, boycotted or refused to sell and bakery products. Other major industry restricted resale, participated in trade groups for price-fixing litigation have been associations whose practices are in violation of meat products and beer (Table 2) . the antitrust law, rotated customers, limited [8] , beef [8, 10, 12] , support the plaintiffs' allegations that price milk [9, 20] , bread [19] , and broiler cases [2, 21] .
changes were the result of conspiratorial The reader is referred to [15] for brief summaractivity among the codefendants [14] . This ies of these cases.
case was settled on the basis that the codefendants did not violate any antitrust laws and that they did not cause damages to the plain-SOME ECONOMIC ISSUES tiffs and their classes. The defendants paid $25 million to the settling plaintiffs, however, as Economic theory does not provide a totally insurance against the unpredictable nature of adequate basis for predicting price fixing and this massive and complex litigation. For comother forms of collusive behavior. By combinpetitive food and agricultural industries with ing it with industrial organization analysis, generally low profit rates, the "nuisance" however, the economist does have a reasonable value of antitrust settlements may seem exormeans of detecting tacit collusion. Such strucbitant. tural characteristics as high seller concentration, the absence of a fringe of small sellers,
In the Utah Pie case three national frozen pie severe entry barriers, a standardized or homomakers had engaged in price discrimination in geneous product, similar vertical marketing arboth a legal and aneconomic sense.For rangements among competing sellers, static or example, one national firm sold pies for $4 per declining demand, and/or a high ratio of fixed dozen in Alhabra, California, but only $2.74 to variable costs can be partial signals of misper dozen in Ogden, Utah even though the conduct. These factors do not either individualmanufacturing plant was closer to Alhambra. ly or jointly provide a definite basis for con-
The price discounting that occurred was cluding that price-fixing exists, however.
usually off-list. After a series of court battles,
Economists and lawyers representing antithe Supreme Court found evidence of predatrust enforcement agencies and plaintiffs attory intent by each of the three national comtempt to demonstrate the existence of price panies and that the declining price structure fixing with specific kinds of economic evidence.
for frozen pies in Utah was evidence of price "Proof" of implicit collusion involves the discrimination which had the requisite injury demonstration of one or more of the following to competition [4] . Elzinga and Hogarty confactors: fixed relative market shares, price ducted an econometric analysis of the court's discrimination, exchanges of price decision on pie prices. They concluded that information, identical bids, price-quantity there was very little immediate effect on the changes unexplained by variations in cost price of frozen fruit pies. More importantly, industrywide resale price maintenance, the they found the Robinson-Patman Act had the level and pattern of profits, and basing point effect of aering the identity of players in the pricing. Though these factors may raise the market. Though the national pie companies requestion of price collusion, they do not provide duced their presence in the Utah market after inviolate "proof." their unsuccessful court battles, the local family-operated Utah Pie Company went out Because of improved offensive economic of business despite a favorable court decision. tools and the increasing likelihood of antitrust The protection from competition under the litigation, otherwise competitive agricultural Robinson-Patman Act is thus marginal and and food industries need expert legal and ecoexaggerated by the Act's critics. According to nomic assistance to protect themselves from Elzinga and Hogarty, price discrimination can arbitrary actions and nuisance suits. Agriculsignal a breakdown in market power and a tural economists can assist the defendants' movement toward a competitive equilibrium antitrust bar by describing the competitive and not necessarily the exploitation of a nature of the particular market under attack. monopoly position [6, p. 38 ]. In one set of the sugar price-fixing cases inOf considerable importance to agricultural volving three sugar companies defending marketing economists is the recent Supreme themselves against more than 100 industrial Court decision involving the Illinois Brick sugar users, the defense was built largely Company [7] . In this case the State of Illinois around the market forces affecting supply and and 700 local government entities charged that demand for the historical period. A detailed concrete block manufacturers had engaged in a analysis of the various and competitive factors price-fixing conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the market was provided in the context of inof the Sherman Act. Because block manufactstitutional restraints and government conurers sell their products directly to masonry trols. The Polopolus affidavit concluded that contractors, who in turn sell blocks to general contractors, state governmental agencies are attorneys', and consultants' fees, court costs, indirect purchasers. The Supreme Court held computer data services, and the time and rethat purchasers cannot sue alleged price-fixers sources of company employees and officers, unless they deal directly with them. One not to mention the millions of dollars in out of immediate effect of the Illinois Brick decision court settlements. In one relatively small case, is to limit consumer class action suits to retail Utah Pie, Elzinga and Hogarty estimated the price fixing, which traditionally has not been legal defense costs to be about $1 million which the dominant part of price-fixing cases. There represented the value of 3 million frozen fruit is evidence that in the class action broiler cases pies [6, p. 34] . They estimated the total direct the plaintiffs' attorneys narrowed their classes cost of complying with and litigating the of litigants to direct purchasers of chickens [2] .
Robinson-Patman Act to be $1.4 billion for the If price fixing occurs at one stage of a compli-1936-1974 period, with food cases representing cated agricultural marketing system, it is exmore than one half of the total [6, p. 35-36] . tremely difficult to estimate the impact of the This is not to say that antitrust enforcement violation on prices in all subsequent stages, has not deterred misconduct among competing particularly if a raw agricultural product is sellers. In several classic examples of priceused in several different processed products fixing conspiracies, judicial action resulted in and sold in disparate markets. Even in fairly lower consumer prices. In the 1965 bread case simple vertical marketing systems, it would be in the state of Washington, several bakers and difficult to estimate how much injury occurred the largest food chain were found guilty of surat each stage of the marketing and distribution pressing price competition and maintaining system. Though Congress has not yet taken uniform and noncompetitive prices. During the action on this issue, there is some speculation conspiracy period, bread prices in Washington that antitrust laws will be amended explicitly averaged 20 percent above the U.S. average, to permit recovery by indirect purchasers.
whereas before the conspiracy prices had been about equal to the U.S. average. After the COST AND BENEFITS OF violation was determined, bread prices ENFORCEMENT dropped below the national average. Mueller estimated that the conspiracy "cost" The number of antitrust class action suits Washington consumers $35 million [13, p. 87] . which are settled out of court raises serious
The costs of litigation and enforcement, howquestions about the efficiency of antitrust ever, need to be substracted before a final policies and enforcement procedures. The societal judgment of the bread cases can be general policy, of course, is to protect the made. In a few instances farmers and fishermen consumer from business conduct which reIn a few instances farmes and fishermen duces social welfare. Curbing antitrust violahave attempted to redress alleged inequities in tions and otherwise promoting perfect compethe marketing system by class action suits tition does involve enforcement and litigation against food handlers and processors. Prochascosts which are not insignificant.
ka, for example, conducted an interesting The opportunity for treble damages in empirical analysis of the impact on prices and private antitrust litigation, particularly, marketing margins of litigation brought by creates perverse incentives and may not be in king mackeral fishermen and the subsequent the public interest. The perversity results from formation of a marketing cooperative [17] . the possibility that injured firms may not seek lower prices, but sustain $1 of "wrong" in THE ATTORNEY'S ROLE IN anticipation of $3 of recovery from legal action.
ANTITRUST ACTIONS Also, private treble damages encourage certain firms to allege vaguely anticompetitive As the economists' role in antitrust cases behavior-which in fact did not occur-in has changed over time, so has there been some hopes of an out of court settlement. Even in rethinking by the legal profession in relation to nuisance" price-fixing suits, defendants will antitrust cases. The lawyer, working within a pay off some money rather than risk a jury framework of precedents, adheres to the estabtrial. Obviously, consumer welfare is reduced lished legal norms which are not always comin these situations as the costs associated with prehensible to economists. Although he, too, these activities are ultimately tacked onto condeals with abstractions rather than certainties, sumer prices. the attorney has been very reluctant to allow Litigation costs and the value of company models developed by the economist to time expended in defending antitrust cases can influence his approach to legal antitrust issues. be awesome in the food industry. The sugar By using rigid Socratic dialogue developed cases involved millions of dollars for through rigorous cross-examination, the anti-trust lawyer tests the validity of the models lished best when economists and attorneys constructed by the economist to solve understand each other's discipline, including problems. Because any legal issue presupposes inherent limitations and assumptions. a basic adversary action, opposing attorneys using like techniques, mainly cross-examina-CONCLUDING REMARKS tion, attempt to sort out inconsistencies and half-truths according to the basic issue.
Agricultural economists have an important The Socratic technique, though working well role to play in price-fixing and other antitrust with individuals or even groups, leaves much matters involving the food and agribusiness to be desired in analyzing the economic truism industries. This role is augmented by the proof antitrust legislation, particularly such fessional need to determine the nature and vague terminology as contained in Section 1 of degree of competition in agricultural and food the Sherman Act and other subsequent antimarkets and to assess the causes of market trust legislation. The economist may resent the imperfections. If price fixing is proved for a intrusion of the legal adversary technique. Beparticular market, the agricultural economist cause the economist knows little of the operahas adequate tools to estimate what would tion of legal instrumentalities or their ultimate have been competitive prices under normal objective, he may feel greatly frustrated if his market conditions. contribution to the solution of the antitrust
The overall atmosphere of antitrust policies problem is not given full weight. The lawyer, and enforcement is confusing. The basis philosthough he may have less knowledge of the ecoophy of promoting competition has obvious nomic ramifications of antitrust policy under benefits to society. Elzinga and Breit argue the present legal system, does not surrender that efficient antitrust enforcement requires easily to the economist.
the replacement of the present reparations-inIntercommunication between the disciplines duced private action system by public enforceof agricultural economics and law has become ment with optimal fines [5, p. 139 ]. This concluincreasingly important in antitrust matters.
sion is based on the high degree of risk averInterchange of information about the relative sion among corporate managers. That is, large realities of each discipline allows a basic acfinancial penalties will be more likely to deter commodation to be reached whereby both price fixing than stepped-up enforcement pracgroups can contribute their expertise to tices. Jail sentences, injunctive relief (dissolusolving the very vexatious and troublesome tion, divorcement, and divestiture), and problems in the field of antitrust legislation private treble damages are deemed inadequate. and enforcement.
Kirkham complains that the rules of discovThe tools of discovery available to both litiery have been perverted to permit "fumbling gants are interrogatories and depositions.
about in an effort to discover a cause of action" These devices enable the adversary lawyers to [11, p. 10] . He further contends that the courts establish the issues by identifying unresolved have extended the scope of discovery and the facts as well as other controverted matters.
possible scope of the trial to "any period the They also ensure the stability and truthfulness plaintiff wishes to name--10, 20, 30 yearsof the affiant. Ultimately they have much to do dredging up transactions so remote that differwith the determination of both criminal and ent principles of law might then have been apcivil penalties and liabilities imposed by the plicable" [11, p. 10] . We have already discussed courts after the issues have been resolved for the possible perverse incentives from treble an individual antitrust case or consolidated damage actions and have implied that the progroup of antitrust cases. Because in some cases liferation of class action suits has been a chief treble damages can be exacted, the proofs contributor to court congestion. elicited through interrogatories, depositions,
In the years ahead, federal antitrust agencies and affidavits are most important.
are likely to become increasingly suspicious of The economist has an increasingly important the pricing behavior of farmer cooperatives role as an "expert witness" in antitrust and the pricing effects of marketing orders and actions, both public and private. He must be agreements. Given the already substantial and able to translate his findings to the antitrust diverse nature of antitrust activity in food and lawyer who then can use them intelligently in agricultural industries, the future demand for the adversary proceedings for solving antiexpert public and private services of agricultrust issues. This cooperation can be accomptural economists and attorneys is assured.
